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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 “So why did you go to law school?” This question is typically asked 
of every first-year law student countless times. The answers to this 
question fall across a spectrum as diverse as any law student body. 
Some law students pursue law because they want to protect the de-
fenseless and oppressed, others to serve justice, others for financial 
aspirations, and others for reasons too vast to mention. Despite these 
varied motivations, there simply is an essence about the law that in-
trigues, inspires, and draws many people to its study. 
 At one time, the practice of law was viewed as a noble profession,1 
but over the last century the study of law has undergone a significant 
transformation and earned itself a reputation amongst the public as 
                                                                                                                      
 * J.D. Candidate, Florida State University College of Law, 2003. B.S., United States 
Air Force Academy, 1995; M.B.A., Colorado State University, 1999. I first thank God, the 
source of all wisdom and knowledge. Next, I extend my sincere thanks and gratitude to 
John Eidsmoe, Tahirih Lee, Don Rubottom, and Michael Schutt for their insightful reviews 
and constructive critiques of my earlier drafts. I further thank the Florida State Law Re-
view, and I finish with my warmest appreciation to my husband, Chris, who endured nu-
merous versions and offered incredible support and encouragement. 
 1. E.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY; RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED TO 
THE STUDENTS OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES iii, xi-xii (1817) (discussing the virtuous vo-
cation of law and quoting William Blackstone, who stated that law is a profession “which 
distinguishes the criterions of right and wrong; which teaches to establish the one, and 
prevent, punish, or redress the other; which employs in its theory the noblest faculties of 
the soul, and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart”). 
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one of being unethical and greedy, and internally as one composed of 
unsatisfied and unhealthy individuals.2 As a result, many legal edu-
cators, ethicists, psychologists, philosophers, and theorists have 
spent significant time and resources to assess and comment on the 
current condition of the legal profession.3 The consensus is that the 
profession is mired in a dramatic decline of professionalism, a plum-
met of public opinion, and an increased number of dissatisfied and 
dysfunctional attorneys.4 Susan Daicoff calls this the “tripartite cri-
sis,” of the profession.5 Although the existence of the tripartite crisis 
is agreed upon, discussion still indicates that a consensus has not 
been reached as to the cause or proper response.6 As one professor-
practitioner team observed, “[L]awyers have sought a cure for a dis-
ease before agreeing on its nature, symptoms, and causes. We want 
to be happy in our professional lives without investigating seriously 
                                                                                                                      
 2. See, e.g., Michael P. Schutt, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Decline of the Ameri-
can Lawyer: Social Engineering, Religion, and the Search for Professional Identity, 30 RUT-
GERS L.J. 143, 148 (1998) (discussing the hundreds of articles and books written about the 
“crisis” in the legal profession and quoting one prominent judge who cited causes of the cri-
sis to be the commercialization of law as simply a business, the advent that lawyers are 
amoral “hired guns,” and the lost sense of a calling within the profession). 
 3. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on 
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (1997) 
(documenting the research and commentary that supports the basis of the “tripartite cri-
sis”); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, 
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999) (citing numerous stud-
ies that document the level of depression, anxiety, alcoholism and drug abuse, divorce, sui-
cide, and overall poor physical health prevalent within the legal profession); Schutt, supra 
note 2, at 147-51.  
 4. I borrow the label of the “tripartite crisis” from Susan Daicoff as an encompassing 
term to describe the current state of the legal profession. Daicoff, supra note 3, at 1340; see 
also Lawrence Krieger, What We’re Not Telling Law Students—and Lawyers—That They 
Really Need to Know: Some Thoughts-In-Action Toward Revitalizing the Profession From 
Its Roots, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1999) (highlighting the studies showing the large number of 
legal professionals experiencing emotional distress, depression, anxiety, and addictions 
and proposing ten things that law schools should communicate to students in order to 
promote a healthy, happy, and balanced life in the practice of law); Schiltz, supra note 3, at 
915-20 (discussing the well-documented social ills caused or fueled by the environment of 
the big law firm practice); Schutt, supra note 2, at 147 (citing startling poll results reveal-
ing the public opinion of lawyers’ ethical standards to be “low” or “very low” and the fact 
that only twenty percent of lawyers were “very satisfied” with work). 
 5. Daicoff, supra note 3, at 1340-41. 
 6. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field 
of the Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 621, 626 (2001) (calling for the recom-
mitment of law as a learned profession under Karl Llewellyn’s “Grand Tradition of the 
Common Law” and proposing a combined social science and humanities approach to legal 
education); Subha Dhanaraj, Making Lawyers Good People: Possibility or Pipedream?, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2037 (2001) (discussing competing views of moral development, but 
concluding that moral education is critical to the legal profession); Timothy P. Terrell & 
James H. Wildman, Rethinking “Professionalism”, 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 424-32 (1992) (iden-
tifying the need for professionalism and “tradition” and proposing they consist of six inter-
related values: excellence, integrity, respect for the system and rule of law, respect for 
other lawyers, commitment to accountability, and responsibility to adequately distribute 
legal services). 
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why many of us are unhappy. We want, in short, to moralize without 
examining our morals.”7  
 Many commentators note the role law schools and the bar have 
played in perpetuating the tripartite crisis and the responsibilities 
they should assume in addressing it.8 One clinical professor presents 
ten propositions that “collectively represent an approach to life and 
law,” an approach that this professor states is currently undermined 
by law schools.9 He discusses how law schools err by emphasizing a 
necessary disconnect of a student’s conscience from the practical 
study of law.10 I agree that this noted disconnect is a critical compo-
nent cause of the profession’s crisis state, but I would extend this 
proposition by suggesting that law schools commit an even greater 
error by not only disconnecting one’s conscience, but by also discon-
necting the authority of the law from the study of law.  
 The shift to a scientific and amoral approach to the study of law 
manifested by the current legal academia has caused many legal pro-
fessionals to deny an external moral authority and rely upon them-
selves to discover and define an individual or relative sense of moral-
ity. This reliance upon self-enlightenment has created a tremendous 
burden on the conscience of the legal professional and, in application 
permits lawgiving by the judiciary and compromises the fidelity of 
law. This idea, exemplified primarily in legal positivism, is the prem-
ise upon which I enter the cause of crisis discussion. I submit that 
the tripartite crisis is a direct result of a concerted effort by institu-
tionalized legal education to separate the study of law from its exter-
nal moral authority, and I offer that the only hope to alleviate the 
tripartite crisis is to reintegrate the conscience and reconnect the 
lawgiver to the study of law. 
 While I am not an expert in legal education, I do offer a pertinent 
perspective of this law student’s experience, research, and disap-
pointment in the current legal curriculum and philosophy taught by 
many American Bar Association (ABA) accredited institutions. When 
I decided to go to law school, I entered as a citizen wanting to know 
more about the laws that affect every aspect of American life. I ex-
                                                                                                                      
 7. Terrell & Wildman, supra note 6, at 403.  
 8. See Krieger, supra note 4, at 8 (crediting the assumptions by law schools and at-
torney communities that promote the notions: “only the ‘best’ will reliably find success in 
their lives,” and discussing the pressures to perform); Terrell & Wildman, supra note 6, at 
404 (crediting the Bar with directing law schools to focus on moral diversity and economic 
competition versus teaching professionalism and assigning the responsibility to invigorate 
the discussion of professionalism to the Bar). 
 9. Krieger, supra note 4, at 7-8. Clinical Professor Lawrence Krieger is the Director 
of Clinical Externship Programs at the Florida State University College of Law. He has 
written and made many presentations on the role legal education has played and should be 
playing in making healthy and happy legal professionals.  
 10. Id. 
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pected to learn the rule of law and develop the skills necessary to 
seek justice and uphold right. Admittedly naive, I expected law 
school instruction to include a basis from which law finds its author-
ity beyond the bench and beyond man. I expected to approach 
graduation inspired and motivated about entering the profession of 
law, but instead my expectations remain overwhelmingly unfulfilled 
by the legal positivism and moral relativism endemic in law school 
today.  
 In the first part of this Paper, I address the contribution law 
schools have made to the tripartite crisis by instructing that man is 
the sole creator and authority of the law and that law evolves 
through the synthesis of man’s wisdom. I begin by reviewing the his-
tory of American legal instruction and its acceptance of a scientific 
approach to the study of law. I discuss the transition from traditional 
legal philosophy to a moral relativism that permeates today’s legal 
curriculum. As a result of this departure, the legal profession con-
sists of lawyers and judges practicing law with no moral compass and 
without the authority to set standards of ethical conduct.  
 In the second part of this Paper, I review the ABA’s impact on the 
profession through its accreditation of legal education and its evolu-
tion of expected standards of conduct. The ABA’s concern over the 
profession’s current status has brought about ethics commissions, 
committees on professional responsibility, and increasingly more 
model rules. However, these attempts to address the crisis do not 
penetrate the heart of the issue: that many ABA-accredited legal in-
stitutions teach as if morality and truth are separate from law and 
that law is ever-evolving through the enlightenment of men. This le-
gal philosophy leaves no one, including the bench and the bar, with 
the moral authority to say what is right and what is wrong, despite 
the perpetual efforts of both the bench and bar to do so. I discuss the 
impact of this legal philosophy on the rule of law. I identify the moral 
authority missing from current legal instruction and suggest that 
without acknowledgement of this authority the legal profession will 
simply continue its demise deeper into the tripartite crisis. 
II.   HISTORY OF LEGAL INSTRUCTION 
A.   America’s Early Legal Instruction 
 Before the establishment of law schools, the American lawyer be-
gan with a legal apprenticeship and the study of the Commentaries 
on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone.11 Blackstone’s in-
                                                                                                                      
 11. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Wayne Morri-
son ed., Cavendish Publishing Limited 2001) (1756); ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 19, 21 (1953); HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at xiv; JOSEF REDLICH, THE 
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struction reflected the 18th Century consensus that human law is 
subordinate to “the law of nature and the law of revelation.”12 His le-
gal instruction began with these foundations before even mentioning 
the law of nations or municipalities.13 This premise evidenced Black-
stone’s belief in God and eloquently articulated the development of 
the English Common Law from the Holy Scriptures.14  
                                                                                                                      
COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT 
TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 7-8 (1914); see 
HERBERT W. TITUS, GOD, MAN, AND LAW: THE BIBLICAL PRINCIPLES 4 (Institute in Basic 
Life Principles 1999) (1994) (summarizing the history of American legal instruction).  
 12. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 31-32. 
 13. Id. Municipal law is “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a 
state, commanding what is ‘right’ and prohibiting what is wrong” that governs districts, 
communities, or nations. It is distinguished from natural, or revealed law “which is the 
rule of moral conduct.” Id. at 33. 
 14. Id. at 29-32. The following excerpt from Commentaries on the Law of England, 
Volume 1, Section 2, is William Blackstone’s premise of the law of nature and the revealed 
law. A premise that he found absolutely necessary to ensure the proper subordination of 
civil law to the superior: 
Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action 
. . . . [a]nd it is that rule of action, which is prescribed by some superior, and 
which the inferior is bound to obey. 
 Thus when the supreme being formed the universe, and created matter out of 
nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can 
never depart, and without which it would cease to be. . . . 
 Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his 
creator, for he is entirely a dependant being. A being independent of any other, 
has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of de-
pendence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he 
depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all 
those points wherein his dependence consists. . . . And consequently, as man 
depends absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is necessary that he 
should in all points conform to his maker’s will. 
 This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he cre-
ated matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain 
rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and 
endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down 
certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some de-
gree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to dis-
cover the purport of those laws. 
 Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unques-
tionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, 
however unjust or severe. But as he is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has 
laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that ex-
isted in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the 
eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his 
dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, 
so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among oth-
ers are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and 
should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian 
has reduced the whole doctrine of law. 
 But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended 
only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be obtained 
than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wanted 
some inducement to have quickened their enquiries, and the greater part of the 
world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance its insepa-
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rable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, 
and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to contrive 
the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other 
prompter to enquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-
love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so 
inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each 
individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, 
if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In conse-
quence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not 
perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, 
referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly sur-
mised; but has graciously reduced the role of obedience to this one paternal 
precept, ‘that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness’. This 
is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. . . .  
 But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it is 
still necessary to have recourse to reason: whose office it is to discover, as was 
before observed, what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life; by 
considering, what method will tend the most effectually to our own substantial 
happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his 
transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, 
unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the talk would be pleasant and easy; 
we should need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary 
in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of 
ignorance and error. 
 This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine provi-
dence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness 
of human reason, has been pleased, at sundry times in divers manners, to dis-
cover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines 
thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only 
in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon compari-
son to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their con-
sequences to man’s felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the 
knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason, in its present corrupted 
state; since we find that, until they are revealed, they were hid from the wis-
dom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same 
original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal 
strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more 
authenticity than that moral system, which is framed by ethical writers, and 
denominated the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly de-
clared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of hu-
man reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as 
we are of the former, both would have an equal authority: but, till then, they 
can never be put in any competition together. 
 Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, de-
pend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to con-
tradict these. There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in 
which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but 
which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within cer-
tain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and effi-
cacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only 
declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the case 
of murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the 
natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this 
crime. . . . 
 If man were to live in a state of nature, unconnected with other individuals, 
there would be no occasion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the 
law of God. Neither could any other law possibly exist: for a law always sup-
poses some superior who is to make it; and in a state of nature we are all equal, 
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 Blackstone taught that man was “subject to the laws of his crea-
tor” and that “man depends absolutely upon his maker for every 
thing,” making it necessary for man to “conform to his maker’s 
will.”15 He spoke of “eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to 
which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and 
which he [the creator] has enabled human reason to discover.”16 
Blackstone approached the study of law with the underlying belief 
that “the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason” limited 
man’s ability to attain knowledge of truth separate from God and the 
Holy Scriptures.17 He professed that the divine law of infinite author-
ity is not attainable by reason, but only by revelation; and stated 
that:  
[T]he revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that 
moral system, which is framed by ethical writers . . . . [b]ecause 
one is the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God him-
self; the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we 
imagine to be at law.18  
Blackstone further instructed: 
This law of nature . . . dictated by God himself, is of course supe-
rior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all 
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if 
contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their 
force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this 
original.19 
This submission to God, creation, and revelation cited by Blackstone 
was the foundation of law that dominated legal education and guided 
America’s Founding Fathers.20  
                                                                                                                      
without any other superior but him who is the author of our being. But man 
was formed for society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on this subject, 
is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, 
as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great soci-
ety, they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, com-
monwealths, and nations, entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a 
mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to regulate this mutual in-
tercourse called “the law of nations,”: which as none of these states will ac-
knowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by either; but depends 
entirely upon the rules of natural law . . . being the only one to which both 
communities are equally subject: and therefore the civil law very justly ob-
serves . . . . 
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 29-32. 
 15. Id. at 29. 
 16. Id. at 30. 
 17. Id. at 30. 
 18. Id. at 31-32.  
 19. Id. at 30-31.  
 20. Id. at 29-32; see DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776): 
When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to 
dissolve the political bands . . . and to assume among the powers of the earth, 
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 The study of Blackstone’s Commentaries and apprenticeships re-
mained the primary means of legal education in America until the 
late 1800’s despite the founding of Tapping Reeve Law School in 
1784, and the subsequent establishment of Harvard Law School in 
1817 and Yale Law School in 1843.21 These institutions were the first 
to implement a systemized legal curriculum including the study of 
the Bible, Common Law, Moral and Political Philosophy, Elementary 
and Constitutional Principles of Municipal Law, and the Law of Na-
tions.22 Schools typically used the traditional lecture or textbook 
methods for instruction, which organized the law in definite courses 
and systematically presented the law in a methodical and compre-
hensive manner to relay the principles of common law and equity.23 
Students also read court opinions and studied cases, not to discover 
what the law is, but “always in a purely illustrative way” to better 
understand the principles of law as they applied to specific legal con-
troversies.24  
B.   From Blackstone’s Commentaries to Langdell’s Case Method 
 When Charles William Eliot assumed the presidency of Harvard 
College in 1869, he set out to propagate his belief that man’s knowl-
edge increased through a scientific mind. To propagate this belief, he 
fashioned a new faith for American education, a faith in man and his 
ability to gain knowledge through scientific discovery independent 
from the Creator. Eliot began the secularization process of legal edu-
cation at Harvard Law School by offering a professorship to Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell.25 Eliot selected Langdell because he shared 
                                                                                                                      
the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s 
God entitles them . . . . We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights . . . . And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the 
protection of Divine Providence. 
Id.; HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at xi-xvii, 31 (stating “[t]he common law of England, which 
forms the great body of our own [American] law”); see also JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 417 (6th prtg. 2003) (examining the education faith of the founding 
fathers and documenting that the principles relied upon by Blackstone were the same 
principles the Founding Fathers relied upon to declare independence from England and 
begin a new nation).  
 21. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 7-8; Tapping Reeve and the Litchfield Law School, at 
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/lawlib/History/tappingreeve.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003); 
Welcome to Harvard Law School, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/about/tour (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2003); Yale Law School, at http://www.law.yale.edu (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). 
 22. Michael Ariens, Law School Branding and the Future of Legal Education, 34 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 301, 308 (2003); see HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at xvi-xvii, xxxi (outlining the cur-
riculum for law students in 1817).  
 23. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 8.  
 24. Id.; TITUS, supra note 11, at 5.  
 25. When Harvard College received its first charter in 1634, it adopted the seal of 
“three open books on the field of an heraldic shield, with the motto ‘Veritas’ (Truth) in-
scribed.” The president of Harvard early in the nineteenth century, Josiah Quincy, ex-
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his commitment to convert education, more particularly legal educa-
tion, to an inductive science.26 Langdell expressly designated his ap-
proach as a “scientific method” and enunciated:  
First, that the law is a science; secondly, that all the available ma-
terials of that science are contained in printed books. . . . If it be a 
science, it will scarcely be disputed that it is one of the greatest 
and most difficult of sciences, and that it needs all the light that 
the most enlightened seat of learning can throw upon it.27  
 After ten months of his professorship, Langdell was elected as the 
first dean at Harvard Law School and served as dean for twenty-five 
years.28 During his deanship he implemented this scientific method 
by championing the case study method and appointing professors 
that agreed with this approach.29 The case method revolutionized le-
gal philosophy by equating the science of law with the evolutionary 
principles manifested by Charles Darwin’s theories on the origins of 
life. Langdell stated that “[l]aw, considered as a science, consists of 
certain principles or doctrines. . . Each of these doctrines has arrived 
at its present state by slow degrees; in other words; it is a growth, ex-
tending in many cases through centuries.”30  
 At the time, this philosophy directly contradicted the current phi-
losophy and jurisprudence of Blackstone and traditional legal educa-
tors.31 Langdell replaced the lecture method of imparting law as logi-
cally connected principles and norms with the case study method, in-
structing law students to derive the rules of law step-by-step through 
                                                                                                                      
plained that “the books were probably intended to represent the Bible; and the motto to in-
timate, that in Scripture alone important truth was to be sought and found, and not in 
words of man’s devising.” A few years later, Harvard changed its motto to “In Christi Glo-
riam” (In Christ Be Glory) and then again to “Christo et Ecclesiae” (For Christ and 
Church). But nearly 200 years later, President Charles William Eliot, 1869 to 1909, re-
moved any reference to Christ and the church and adopted “Veritas” (Truth) alone, sepa-
rate from the divine. Eliot believed that man’s knowledge increased through man’s scien-
tific discovery alone, and recruited professors who shared this belief. TITUS, supra note 11, 
at 1-2 (quoting from JOSIAH QUINCY, THE HISTORY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 48 (1840)). 
 26. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 15; TITUS, supra note 11, at 3. 
 27. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 15 (quoting Langdell’s explanation of his scientific ap-
proach to legal studies during a speech to the Harvard Law School Association on Novem-
ber 5, 1886).  
 28. TITUS, supra note 11, at 4. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 11 (quoting C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS: WITH REFERENCES AND CITATIONS, PREPARED FOR USE AS A TEXT-BOOK IN 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL vi (1871)); TITUS, supra note 11, at 4. 
 31. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 40 (stating that the laws laid down by God 
are “eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dis-
pensations conforms”); REDLICH, supra note 11, at 45 (defining jurisprudence as the leading 
fundamental principles that are more or less common to the modern law of every civilized 
people). 
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the analysis of court opinions.32 Langdell taught that cases “were the 
‘original sources’ of legal doctrines and principles” and acted as the 
samples for the legal scientist’s study.33 Therefore by studying these 
samples, the law student could systematically extract the rule of 
law.34 The student’s analytical decomposition of each case was to be 
done as independently as possible with guidance from the teacher.35 
This approach, known as the “Socratic Method,” forbade the student 
from simply accepting any legal doctrine.36 Rather, it held that legal 
doctrines are in a constant state of flux and are continually to be 
brought into question.37 Langdell’s legal instruction expressed a cer-
tain social order in judicial form.38 He did not simply introduce a new 
teaching method or technique, but rather he introduced a faith in 
man’s ability to discern law apart from the Creator and the authority 
of the law.39  
 By design, Langdell set out to eliminate both God and the Holy 
Scripture from the study of law. His case study method approach 
brought about a change not only in the method of instruction, but 
also in the law school curriculum. The first year curriculum involving 
the Bible, common law, and moral and political philosophy was re-
placed with fields of law including contracts, torts, property, civil 
procedure, and criminal law. He replaced the belief in moral truth 
and a lawgiver with the positivist belief that legal doctrines and 
principles of law were “living” and developed by men over a long pe-
riod.40 The underlying presumption of Langdell’s case study method 
was the belief that law is merely a body of rules laid down by human 
lawmakers, and therefore the legal analysis of cases is the best man-
ner in which to learn. With this presumption, the case study ap-
proach was thought to be the only way to create predictability in the 
application of evolving legal principles. By 1880, Langdell’s scientific 
approach gained momentum and began to form the benchmark for 
institutionalized legal education. 
 Dr. Redlich, prominent member of the Austrian Parliament and 
Professor of Law at the University of Vienna, conducted a study of 
America’s legal education in 1913.41 His task was to assess the meth-
ods of instruction used within law schools. He spent a great deal of 
                                                                                                                      
 32. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 13; Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to 
Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 121, 128 (1994). 
 33. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 11; TITUS, supra note 11, at 5. 
 34. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 11; TITUS, supra note 11, at 5. 
 35. REDLICH, supra note 11, at 13.  
 36. Id. at 12-13.  
 37. Id. at 13.  
 38. Id.  
 39. TITUS, supra note 11, at 5. 
 40. Id. at 5-6. 
 41. REDLICH, supra note 11, at vi.  
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time examining the case study method and its apparently sudden, 
almost inexplicable triumph in American legal education.42 He stated 
that the “development of the case method in American law schools 
has produced a far-reaching change in the general conception of the 
nature and purpose of legal education.”43 He found that the case 
study method truly imparted legal knowledge by allowing students to 
work through abstract legal thoughts for themselves.44 However, he 
feared that too much “is demanded and expected of a novice in the 
law school.” He discussed that students are assumed to “study for 
themselves the standard works of English and American law, such as 
Blackstone, Story, [and] Anson,” but concludes that under the case 
study method “students never obtain a general picture of the law as a 
whole,” nor do they get the historical survey necessary to compre-
hend legal concepts and doctrines.45  
 Despite these shortcomings, nearly all law schools in the nation 
implemented Langdell’s case study method as the primary approach 
to legal studies by 1914.46 Later developments in the case study 
method recognized the need for students to be exposed to the broader 
context of law and attempted to address this by inserting non-case 
materials in casebooks.47 Nonetheless, varying forms of the case 
study method and legal positivism have remained relatively un-
changed within America’s legal institutions since.48 
 I do not disparage the reason and scientific discovery practiced 
within the case study method, for in themselves they effectively en-
gage and challenge students of the law. But when they are combined 
with legal positivism, left without historical perspective, and inde-
pendent from the principles impressed by the Creator, they provide 
no limits on the legal profession and no constant for the rule of law.49 
By eliminating a divine authority, Langdell directed American legal 
institutions down a wide path lacking eternal truths. Many protested 
Langdell’s beliefs and method of instruction, but his scientific ap-
proach gained influence and momentum as it trained the next gen-
eration of legal professionals and recruited many faithful supporters, 
particularly Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.50  
                                                                                                                      
 42. Id. at 15.  
 43. Id. at 25.  
 44. Id. at 29.  
 45. Id. at 30, 41-43.  
 46. See id. at 29-35 (discussing the penetration and success of the case method in 
American law schools by 1914). 
 47. HARNO, supra note 11, at 68-69. 
 48. TITUS, supra note 11, at 5-6. 
 49. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11; HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at xxxi.  
 50. TITUS, supra note 11, at 6. 
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C.   Influence of Holmes 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is an icon within late-twentieth-
century-American jurisprudence and has been credited as one of the 
greatest influences in the divergence from classical legal philosophy 
and legal instruction.51 Holmes graduated from Harvard Law School 
and was nominated to the Supreme Court of the United States by 
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1902.52 Between his twenty-nine 
years on the Court, his professorship at Harvard, and publications on 
the common law, Holmes, as one of the first legal pragmatists, 
propagated his beliefs in the evolutionary, scientific approach to law: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. . . . 
The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through 
many centuries . . . . In order to know what it [law] is, we must 
know what it has been, and what it tends to become.53  
Under this belief, Holmes declared The Common Law “dead” claim-
ing that “the theories and points of view that were new in it, now 
have become familiar to the masters and even to the middle-men and 
distributors of ideas—writers of textbooks and practical works.”54 In 
other words, Holmes now considered The Common Law a classic and 
dismissed it as an originating source of legal theory.55  
 Holmes’ legal philosophy, developed under Langdell, served as the 
mentor and guide for generations of progressive legal scholars, in-
cluding Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn, and Richard Posner.56 His le-
gal philosophy defined the role of lawyers and judges as engineers for 
the “good” of society. Holmes believed the “scientific” legal scholar or 
judge should dismiss deductive reasoning for the evaluation of com-
peting social ends in light of statistics, economics, and social de-
sires.57 He intertwined the “scientific” quest with the social engineer-
                                                                                                                      
 51. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW, at xi (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963); see John S. Baker, Jr., Natural Law and Jus-
tice Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 471, 489 (2000) (referring to Justice Holmes as Justice 
Story’s “positivist counterpart” and as the one leading American legal thought away from 
natural law. Baker goes on to cite Holmes as the creator of “substantive due process,” 
which relied upon the assumption that “federal courts have the power to use their judg-
ment as to what the rules of common law are” as a means to substantiate state economic 
regulations); Schutt, supra note 2, at 155-58 (stating that Holmes’ view of law as a tool for 
social engineering “was the initial break with the traditional view of the legal profession”).  
 52. The Legal Information Institute, Biographies of the Justices, Associate Justices, 
at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/cases/judges.htm (select: Oliver W. Holmes (1902-
1932))  (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). 
 53. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). 
 54. Howe, supra note 51, at x (quoting Autograph Letter from Holmes, to Joaquim 
Nabuco (January 3, 1908) (on file with Harvard Law School)).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Schutt, supra note 2, at 153-58, 176. 
 57. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9-159, 300-01 (1995); G. 
EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 113 (1993).  
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ing quest and instructed that “legal rules and other forms of law are 
most essentially tools devised to serve practical ends, rather than 
general norms laid down by officials in power, secular embodiments 
of natural law, or social phenomena . . . . As a social instrumentality, 
law exists to serve those ends.”58  
 Since the 1920s, Holmes’ legacy has trained three generations of 
lawyers, law professors, and judges and continues to do so in today’s 
legal academy. Holmes’ influence has transformed law into a social 
engineering tool. The tool that, by neglecting all others, designates 
the judicial bench and the bar as the primary social engineers, and 
lawyers as the ones responsible to shape and direct society into con-
formance.59 Within this design, legal education has played the pur-
posed role of training and directing the next generation of social en-
gineers by teaching law students to “think like lawyers”—an “ends-
means thinking” critical to the survival of a pragmatic approach to 
law.60 The lawyer does not begin with general principles and reason 
“forward” to an existing and inevitable conclusion. Rather, the law-
yer starts with a claim or desired outcome—the client’s goal. The 
lawyer’s role is to develop or design justificatory strategies to reach 
the client’s goal, “reasoning backward through a process akin to ‘re-
verse engineering.’”61  
 The pragmatism of John Dewey and the utilitarianism of Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill sculpted Holmes’ legal theory and 
justified his rejection of morality as a fundamental aspect of law. 
Holmes discredited the idea that commonly shared moral values 
serve a significant role in the law:  
It remains to be proved that, while the terminology of morals is 
still retained, and while the law does still and always, in a certain 
sense, measure legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless, 
by the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting 
those moral standards into external or objective ones, from which 
the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly eliminated.62  
Accordingly, Holmes rejected morality as a source for establishing 
social objectives and claimed that the will of the majority was the 
better determinate. “The first requirement of a sound body of law is, 
that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the 
                                                                                                                      
 58. Schutt, supra note 2, at 156 (quoting ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND 
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 20-21 (1982)). 
 59. Id. at 158-59. 
 60. CLARENCE MORRIS, HOW LAWYERS THINK 123, 126-44 (1937) (stating that “as val-
ues change, and as unthought-of situations arise, and as new analytical abilities develop,” 
the rules of law change. This premise is to support his proposed method of problem-solving 
that judges and lawyers should use to fulfill their role of assessing public policy and of cor-
recting and elaborating on the “vagueness” within the rule of law). 
 61. Saunders & Levine, supra note 32, at 183. 
 62. HOLMES, supra note 53, at 33. 
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community, whether right or wrong.”63 Therefore, Holmes believed 
that there is no moral authority by which to determine something to 
be “right” or “wrong,”64 essentially eliminating any standard by 
which the law and the legal profession is to be governed.  
 Langdell’s scientific approach to law, denying any divine authority 
and lacking historical perspective, made it possible for Holmes to 
dismiss the moral dimension of law and redefine the role of lawyers 
in society. This radical departure from the philosophies and juris-
prudence of Blackstone and early-American lawyers left the profes-
sion with no basis or authority to address morality and professional 
responsibility. The transformation of the legal profession over the 
last century and a half creates a great hurdle for legal education to 
overcome if it intends to adequately address the tripartite crisis. 
III.   CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS ON CURRENT LEGAL INSTRUCTION 
 Despite the prominence Blackstone’s Commentaries held in early 
American legal education, they remain relatively unknown in con-
temporary legal study. Rather, the secular study of law developed by 
Langdell and Holmes is known to generations of law students, in-
cluding those currently in attendance. Modern law students are in-
timately familiar with the prestige of Harvard Law School and the 
case study method that originated therein. Students generally do not 
begin with introductory courses on the common law or jurisprudence. 
Rather, they are thrust into the varying fields of law and indoctri-
nated with the case study method of reading and analyzing court 
opinions to discover original principles of law. These principles of 
law, governing judicial decisions, are not explicit in the court opinion; 
rather, the student is expected to scientifically derive the principles 
from the holdings and supporting rationales. Through analytical rea-
soning, the student discerns the origination and evolution of the legal 
principle via the chronological study of cases.65 The abandonment of 
authority does not arise from the analytical reasoning itself, but 
rather the exclusive use of cases and absence of other sources of law.  
 Current legal instruction dictates legal positivism and the concept 
of the “living” law, and also promotes the lawyer’s role as an advo-
                                                                                                                      
 63. HOLMES, supra note 53, at 36; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 
10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 64. See Howe, supra note 51, at xxvi:  
[Holmes urged] that morals, like law, must take account of the teaching of 
Darwin and recognize that so long as nature preserves man’s instinct to survive 
and prosper, it has endorsed the self-preferring impulse. Neither a scheme of 
morals nor a philosophy of law will be true to the facts of history and psychol-
ogy if it classifies an instinct endorsed by nature as “unjustified.” 
 65. Harold J. Berman & Charles Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Sci-
ence: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 514 (1996). 
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cate. Students are taught that courts make law and that the court’s 
holding creates a binding law on all persons and lower courts within 
its jurisdiction. As a result, students understand that learning and 
developing the rule of law is a slow process, and the positive law of 
today may or may not drastically change with the next opinion. If a 
different court reviews the case, or if slightly distinguishable facts 
arise to which that case law is being applied, or if an advocate simply 
makes a compelling policy argument, the governing law may change. 
Yes, the law student is instructed on the duty of candor to the tribu-
nal and the duty to introduce jurisdictional case law both in support 
and opposition to the position taken, but any boundaries beyond 
those are left open to argument. And this argument is dependent 
upon the lawyer’s strategy and persuasiveness, and often tailored to 
the leanings or reputation of the judge. The law student is instructed 
to be a zealous and loyal advocate for the client. The craft of persua-
siveness becomes the challenge and goal in this adversarial process, 
not justice or what is right. What remains absent from legal instruc-
tion is any authority or lawgiver to which the law is submissive and 
the lawyer accountable.  
 Within the walls of the legal academy, it has become common to 
hear “law is what we make it” and “morals have nothing to do with 
law.” The only instruction students receive in the moral dimension of 
law is at best found in the context of how the lawyer must detach in-
dividual moral principles and advocate for the client. Such moral 
content is far from explicit. There is no discussion of an authoritative 
base of law or eternal principles that guide the law beyond human 
thought and philosophy.66 In this absence, legal instruction perpetu-
ates an understanding among law students, and in turn practitio-
ners, that the profession of law is conducted in a “simplified ethical 
world, one in which ordinary moral principles are cleared away by 
the hegemony of doctrines unique to the practice of law.”67 These doc-
trines do not call the lawyer to engage his moral conscience, but in-
stead call the practitioner to amorality. 
 A Harvard Law School student describes the first-year experience 
as a process of separation, where a student is taught that “law is in-
finitely malleable, a collection of indeterminate rules and guidelines, 
the meaning of which is never fixed,” and that the “process of profes-
                                                                                                                      
 66. My criminal law instruction included discussion of the principles guiding criminal 
law as: 1) Harm Principle; 2) Offense Principle; 3) Paternalism; 4) Immorality; and 5) De-
terrence. The discussion on criminal law theory included H.L.A. Hart, Kent Greenawalt, 
Jeremy Bentham, and a lot of general discussion on retributivism, utilitarianism, and con-
sequentialism; but there was no discussion of who gives man or the state the authority to 
justly punish crimes.  
 67. Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 37, 38 (2001).  
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sionalization” requires a detached or “neutral” attitude toward the 
law.68 This Harvard Law student’s experience is not an anomaly. The 
Dean of Yale Law School asserts that the profession of law now de-
mands the lawyer-mechanic versus the noble ideal of the lawyer-
statesman.69 The lawyer-statesman served truth while the lawyer-
mechanic serves the client with narrow, technical expertise.70 Dean 
Kronman’s duty to prepare the modern law student for the practice 
of law focuses on advocacy, which in his words, “corrupts the soul by 
encouraging a studied indifference to the truth.”71  
 By contrast, one law school holds itself out as unique among the 
ABA-accredited law schools because it is “committed to the proposi-
tion that there is truth—eternal principles of justice—about the way 
we should practice law and the law itself. . . . [W]e discuss not only 
what the law is, but also where it came from, and what it ought to 
be.”72 This position should not be unique among law schools but 
rather the standard. In fact, new law schools sharing this commit-
ment to eternal principles are springing up in an effort to fill the void 
left by secular law schools.73  
                                                                                                                      
 68. Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law Students, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 2027, 2029 (1998). 
 69. Kenneth W. Starr, Truth and Truth-Telling, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 901, 902 (1999) 
(discussing Dean Kronman’s significant shift in models for the practice of law from the 
lawyer-statesman to the lawyer-mechanic).  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (quoting ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION vii (1993)). 
 72. Dean Brauch’s Welcome Message to Regent University School of Law, at 
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/welcome/home.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).  
 73. There is a movement to establish more faith-based law schools that meet ABA ac-
creditation requirements including: Ave Maria School of Law, opened in August, 1998, 
which states, “[f]aith seeking understanding through reason is essential to discovering 
truth in its fullest sense. Both faith and reason have their origin in God and both are nec-
essary in the pursuit of justice.” Fides et Ratio, Ave Maria School of Law’s motto, expresses 
the Law School’s conviction that faith and reason enhance the study of law and lead to the 
“full attainment of truth.” Ave Maria School of Law, Fides et Ratio, at http://www. avmari-
alaw.edu/prospective/Philosophy/phil.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003); University of St. 
Thomas School of Law opened in August of 2001 and states that its mission “is dedicated to 
integrating faith and reason in the search for truth through a focus on morality and social 
justice.”  University of St. Thomas School of Law, at 
http://www.stthomas.edu/lawschool/mad/mad_mis.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003); Liberty 
University’s School of Law, to open in August, 2004, professes to be committed to “aca-
demic and professional excellence in the context of the Christian intellectual tradition. . . . 
We believe the rule of law is rooted in transcendent principles and objective moral order." 
Liberty University School of Law, at http://www.liberty.edu/Academics/Law/index. 
cfm?PID=4932 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).  
 Also, Jones School of Law was founded in 1928 and is a non-ABA-accredited law school 
that professes to be a Christian law school. It explains that:  
[b]ecause law is the foundation of society and Biblical truth is the foundation of 
just law, the mission of the School of Law is to maintain a distinctively Chris-
tian environment an academically rigorous program of legal education achieved 
through a collaborative effort in which faculty engage students in active, per-
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IV.   STANDARDIZATION AND ACCREDITATION 
 Since its founding in 1878, the ABA has been a proponent of insti-
tutionalized legal education, with the standardization of law school 
curriculum central to its purpose. It created the Committee on Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar in 1893 despite the fact that in 
1891 only one of every five lawyers admitted to the practice of law 
even attended law school.74 In 1921, the ABA promulgated its first 
Standards for Legal Education, marking the first step toward the 
ABA’s role as a law school accrediting agency.75 Shortly thereafter, in 
1921, the ABA published its first list of approved law schools that 
met ABA requirements.76 Between 1921 and 1928 there was a dra-
matic increase in the number of law schools, from 142 to 173 schools, 
with only half of them meeting the ABA standards.77  
 In 1927, no state required graduation from an ABA-accredited law 
school,78 but all states except Indiana required its applicants to pass 
a written exam.79 The ABA initiated the creation of the National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) in 1930 with the purpose of stan-
dardizing the education and admission requirements for the practice 
of law across the nation.80 Within a decade, twenty states required its 
applicants to graduate from an ABA-accredited law school; by the 
late 1970s nearly all states adopted the requirement.81  
                                                                                                                      
formance-based learning to equip students for their role in the institutions of 
justice and to do justice through competent ethical lawyering . . . . 
Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, Mission Statement, at http://www.faulkner.edu/law/ 
welcome/jsl_mission1.cfm (Sept. 25, 2001). 
 74. Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics into the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the 
Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1329 (2003). 
 75. Id. ABA standards for law schools included minimums relating to teacher-student 
ratio, library volumes, student pre-law experience, and number of full-time professors; see 
also Ariens, supra note 22, at 310 (detailing the Special Committee on Legal Education, 
known as the Root Committee, named after committee chairman Elihu Root, who opposed 
differences amongst law schools and state bars). 
 76. Hayden, supra note 74, at 1330.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Ariens, supra note 22, at 310. 
 79. Id. at 310-11. 
 80. National Conference of Bar Examiners, Mission Statement, at http:// 
www.ncbex.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). The NCBE states that its mission is to:  
[D]evelop, maintain, and apply reasonable and uniform standards of education 
and character for eligibility for admission to the practice of law, and to assist 
bar admission authorities by providing standardized examinations of uniform 
and high quality for the testing of applicants for admission to the practice of 
law, disseminating relevant information concerning admission standards and 
practices, conducting educational programs for the members and staffs of such 
authorities, and providing other services such as character investigations and 
conducting research. 
Id. 
 81. Ariens, supra note 22, at 311. 
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 The ABA professes that “every candidate for admission to the bar 
should have graduated from a law school approved by the ABA.”82 
The basis of this belief seems unfounded since this nation began 
training lawyers through self-study and apprenticeship, a method 
that was quite suitable to prepare students to pass the bar exam and 
be admitted into the practice of law for nearly 150 years.83 But the 
ABA-driven transition from oral to written bar exams, and subse-
quently from essay to multiple-choice questions, changed the nature 
of bar exams and created great duplication of efforts across the 
states.84 To address this inefficiency, the ABA proposed and promoted 
the concept of a national bar exam in 1941.85 But it was not until 
1972, with the offering of the Multistate Bar Exam (MBE), that the 
ABA’s standardized testing began to grow its roots.86 Opposition im-
mediately met the MBE, but the ABA understood the challenges fac-
ing a national exam. The ABA recognized the independence of state 
bars and defended the exam as just an option to each state board, the 
“master of its own examination.”87 This approach led to timid but 
eventual acceptance of the MBE and paved the road for the Multi-
state Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE).88 These national ex-
ams, as well as the ABA accreditation requirements, have unques-
tionably furthered the uniformity of legal education and effectuated 
the secularization process and widespread acceptance of legal positiv-
ism.   
V.   FROM CANON TO CODE TO MODEL RULES 
 In 1905, the ABA chartered the Committee on Code of Profes-
sional Ethics to study the feasibility of drafting a clear set of uniform 
rules that could be used to discipline unethical lawyers.89 The ABA 
Committee noted that “[o]nce possible ostracism by professional 
brethren was sufficient to keep from serious error the practitioner 
with no fixed ideals of ethical conduct; but now the shyster, the bar-
ratrously inclined, the ambulance chaser . . . pursue their nefarious 
methods with no check.”90 Following the committee’s study, commit-
                                                                                                                      
 82. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., 
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS, FOREWORD, at http:// 
www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/foreword.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). 
 83. See Hayden, supra note 74, at 1314-17 (detailing the tradition of oral bar exams 
and the introduction of written exams by most states between 1890 and 1914).  
 84. Id. at 1317-21.  
 85. Id. at 1322.  
 86. Id. at 1323.  
 87. Id. at 1324 (quoting John Eckler, The Multistate Bar Examination—August 1974, 
43 BAR EXAMINER 125, 129-30 (1974)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1306 (citing 29 A.B.A. REP. 600 (1906)). 
 90. Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look At the History of the 
1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 8 (1999) (quoting COMMITTEE ON CODE OF 
2004]                          AUTHORITY OF THE LAW? 725 
 
tee member Justice David Brewer stated that the plan was to estab-
lish “a body of rules, few in number, clear and precise in their provi-
sions, so there can be no excuse for their violation, to be given opera-
tive and binding force by legislation or action of the highest courts of 
the states.”91 Therefore, the committee set out to crystallize a stan-
dard of ethics in a written code, not purely for aspirational purposes, 
but rather to effectuate a means of discipline and preserve the repu-
tation of the legal profession.  
 American University Law Professor Susan D. Carle summarized 
the four impetuses cited by historians for the crystallization of the 
1908 Canon of Ethics as: 1) The ABA’s desire to follow the American 
Medical Association’s lead in drafting professional ethics; 2) The in-
spiration of the Progressive Era belief that the population itself could 
improve its moral standards; 3) The declining public opinion of law-
yers; and 4) The concern over the growing “commercialization” of the 
practice of law.92 In response to these prompters, the ABA set out to 
establish the 1908 Canon of Ethics. 
 The ABA committee began by studying two early-nineteenth-
century American treatises on legal ethics, David Hoffman’s 1836 
Fifty Resolutions for Professional Deportment and George Shars-
wood’s 1854 treatise titled Legal Ethics.93 The committee also refer-
enced the ethical codes enacted by various state bar associations, 
particularly the 1887 Alabama code of ethics drafted by Thomas 
Goode Jones.94 During her examination, Professor Carle concluded 
that Hoffman and Sharswood similarly approached legal ethics from 
a tradition based on “religious conviction and a belief that a divine 
intelligence gave human beings moral faculties.”95  
 As a result of these references, the drafting of the 1908 Canons 
properly reflected the moral dimension of law prevalent in America’s 
legal studies and relayed a high moral tone. However, the Canons 
also evidenced the differing views of committee members on the 
proper role and duties of an attorney. Professor Carle concluded that 
rather than “wrestling with the fundamental jurisprudential issues 
underlying their disagreement, the committee members glossed over 
their dispute in their public reports and adopted ineffectual compro-
mise language in the Canons.”96 She further concluded that this com-
                                                                                                                      
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1906); see Hayden, supra note 74, at 1307 (citing 29 A.B.A. REP. 600 
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promise evinced movement toward a “nonaccountability view” that 
separates concerns of justice and morality from client advocacy.97  
 The Canons begin with lawyer’s first duty to the courts premised 
by the preamble professing that “[t]he future of the Republic, to a 
great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and un-
sullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the mo-
tives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the ap-
proval of all just men.”98 However, the Canons later signal the con-
flicting views on the lawyer’s role in Canon 15 titled How Far a Law-
yer May Go in Supporting a Client’s Cause: 
 The lawyer owes “entire devotion to the interest of the client, 
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the 
exertion of his utmost learning and ability,” to the end that noth-
ing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, le-
gally applied. . . . In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the 
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by 
the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every 
such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind 
that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not 
without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not per-
mit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of 
law or any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own con-
science and not that of his client.99  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the number of legal profession-
als educated within law schools dramatically increased and effec-
tually intensified this conflict between serving justice and serving 
the client.  
 Professor Carle noted a shift in legal ethics that “corresponded 
roughly with the introduction of positivism and scientistic models of 
the legal system in American jurisprudence.”100 She explains that the 
religiously based jurisprudence of Hoffman and Sharswood “imbued 
lawyers with the power—and thus the duty—to preserve the tenuous 
connection between human affairs and a divinely inspired moral sys-
tem, [but] the [positivists’] new legal ethics paradigm disavowed any 
such connection between law and morality.”101 While at the same 
time, the social science theories taught that the legal system depends 
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upon impersonal, invisible laws; and therefore an advocate must ful-
fill his role without concern for his beliefs or justice.102  
 The ABA’s adoption of the 1969 Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (ABA Code) reflected this shift in legal ethics and pre-
dominant trend in twentieth-century legal education. The Code re-
tained some of the familiar terms of the Canons, but the legal acad-
emy’s rejection of a moral authority and revamping of a lawyer’s role 
in society called for a new framework of principles to guide legal eth-
ics.103 The preamble began by establishing a reliance on man’s 
knowledge that “[t]he continued existence of a free and democratic 
society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based 
upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the indi-
vidual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-
government.”104 It goes on to define the lawyer’s role as a social engi-
neer: 
 Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preser-
vation of society. . . .  
 In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily 
assumes various roles that require the performance of many diffi-
cult tasks. Not every situation which he may encounter can be 
foreseen, but fundamental ethical principles are always present to 
guide him. Within the framework of these principles, a lawyer 
must with courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the 
body of the law to the ever-changing relationships of society.105  
The preamble then directs that “the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity points the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to 
judge the transgressor.”106 The ABA Code is to provide the standards, 
but the onus is on the lawyer because “[e]ach lawyer must find 
within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the 
extent to which his actions should rise above the minimum stan-
dards.”107 However, if the lawyer’s own conscience is insufficient, 
than “it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of 
his profession of the society which he serves that should provide to a 
lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical con-
duct.”108  
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 103. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1253 
(1991). 
 104. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. (1981), reprinted in 2002 
SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 154 (Thomas D. Morgan & 
Ronald D. Rotunda eds., Foundation Press 2002) 
 105. Id. 
 106. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl., supra  note 104, at 155. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
728  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:707 
 
 The 1969 Code detailed the responsibilities, duties, and obliga-
tions for the legal professional and thus amplified the discussion of 
legal ethics. Harvard Law School professor Lon Fuller asserted that 
“the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, 
[while] the morality of duty starts at the bottom.”109 He attached a 
moral scale “starting at the bottom with the conditions obviously es-
sential to social life and ending at the top with the loftiest strivings 
toward human excellence. The lower rungs of this scale represent the 
morality of duty; its higher reaches, the morality of aspiration.”110 He 
envisioned a pointer that marks the balance between the pressures of 
duty and the challenges of aspiration.111 And he referenced “the inner 
morality of law” that is clearly and coherently known in nature, an 
inner morality that presents both a morality of duty and a morality 
of aspiration.112 He acknowledges that if society asserts a duty, the 
lawmaker will always “confront the responsibility of defining at what 
point that duty has been violated.”113 He concludes that the “inner 
morality of law is condemned to remain largely a morality of aspira-
tion and not of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a sense of trus-
teeship and to the pride of the craftsman.”114 Nevertheless as the le-
gal profession evidenced more and more signs of the tripartite crisis, 
the 1969 Code gained favor in the aftermath of the Watergate scan-
dal and in consideration of the low regard for the legal profession.115 
 As the tripartite crisis seemed to escalate into the early 1980s,116 
the ABA did not attempt to reintroduce ethical aspirations but rather 
descended further toward the morality of duty by adopting the 1982 
Rules of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. The Model Rules provided authoritative regulation 
in statutory language and interpretative guidance in comments. The 
Model Rules were similar to a restatement and “affirmed that the 
standards of professional conduct were [now] legal obligations and 
not merely professional ones.”117 With organized campaigning, the 
ABA successfully enticed many states to adopt the Model Rules.118 
This wide acceptance signified a monumental decision of the Ameri-
can legal profession to submit itself to binding legal standards and 
represented a unique step in the history of the American judiciary by 
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formulating and enacting a legal code without legislative ratifica-
tion.119  
 More recent modifications and the proposed revision of the Model 
Rules, by the 2000 ABA Ethics Commission, move further away from 
moral aspiration and reduce professional conduct to mandatory re-
sponsibilities and duties of lawyers. This evolution from Canons to 
Rules, from moral aspirations to regulated duties, remarkably coin-
cides with the dissemination of legal positivism and the escalation of 
the tripartite crisis.120 
VI.   MANIFESTATIONS OF LAW WITHOUT AUTHORITY  
 As a result of the Harvard benchmark for the philosophy and 
method of legal education and the ABA’s regulation through accredi-
tation, America’s legal profession bears the fruit of jurisprudence 
void of a divine lawgiver and an inherent moral dimension. One law 
professor poses the following questions as to what happens to the 
rule of law when the source or authority of that law is dismissed. 
“What principled limits exist to civil authority; what pre-existent, 
known precepts supply rules for new cases; what gives rise to the 
equality of all before the law; what warns men from pretending to 
the prerogatives of the perfect?”121 These relevant questions intro-
duce the unavoidable issues arising from a century of legal instruc-
tion that breeds the moral, and thus legal, relativism evident today. 
This relativism is not neutral, but preferences secularism. It prohib-
its professionals from acknowledging any external moral authority 
and creates a new morality that threatens the fidelity of the law and 
contradicts traditional moral belief.  
A.   Law Prohibiting Acknowledgement of God’s Authority 
 In Thomas Jefferson’s most famous work, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, he referenced the “Creator” and “Divine Providence,” thus 
revealing his and the other Founding Fathers’ belief in God.122 Re-
gardless, the U.S. Supreme Court has memorialized Jefferson’s 
comment in a non-authoritative letter to the Danbury Baptist Asso-
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ciation opining that the First Amendment123 was intended to build a 
“wall of separation between Church and State.”124 Based primarily on 
this one comment, the Court has established extensive and intricate 
First Amendment case law governing the relation between the 
church, state, and individual.125 For purposes of context, I narrow 
this discussion to the Court’s demand for religious neutrality, a de-
mand that in practice denies the legal professional’s freedom to ac-
knowledge a divine authority of law.  
 The underlying positivist philosophy directing twentieth-century 
constitutional interpretation is the idea that the Constitution is a liv-
ing document and that constitutional principles evolve with the 
enlightenment of man. This jurisprudence dismisses the original in-
tent of constitutional provisions and permits foundational principles 
to change with the modern wisdom of the Court. The effect: a judici-
ary that overreaches its jurisdiction and becomes the lawmaker.126 As 
James Madison warned in Federalist 47, “where the whole power of 
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the 
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a 
free constitution are subverted.”127 Madison goes on to reference the 
maxims of Montesquieu and quotes, “[w]ere the power of judging 
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legisla-
tor.”128 
 Today’s Court is doing exactly this. It is exercising arbitrary con-
trol and dictating what the legal professional can think and believe. 
The most vivid display of this jurisdictional abuse is in the case in-
volving Alabama’s Chief Justice, Roy Moore.129 As Chief Justice and 
custodian responsible for decorating the Alabama Supreme Court 
Judicial Building, Chief Justice Moore ordered a monument of the 
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Ten Commandments for the rotunda. He clearly stated his intent in 
selecting this display was to depict the moral foundation of law:130  
This monument will serve to remind the appellate courts and 
judges of the circuit and district courts of this state, [and] the 
members of the bar . . . of the truth stated in the preamble of the 
Alabama Constitution, that in order to establish justice, we must 
invoke “the favor and guidance of Almighty God.”131 
Within days of its placement, three Alabama ACLU attorneys filed 
suit asserting that the display violated the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment applicable to the states through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.132  
 In applying the Lemon133 test and other governing Supreme Court 
case law,134 the federal district court held that the display was uncon-
stitutional because it was non-secular with the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion.135 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court decision stating, “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed us 
that for First Amendment purposes religion includes non-Christian 
faiths and those that do not profess belief in the Judeo-Christian 
God; indeed, it includes the lack of any faith.”136 The Court goes onto 
say that “Chief Justice Moore’s proffered definition of religion is in-
consistent with the Supreme Court’s because his presupposes a belief 
in God.”137  
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 The Eleventh Circuit qualifies that not “all recognitions of God by 
government are per se impermissible”138 and cites the Supreme Court 
approved exceptions that permit the acknowledgement of religion in 
“the Declaration of Thanksgiving as a government holiday, our na-
tional motto ‘In God We Trust,’ its presence on our money, and the 
practice of opening court sessions with ‘God save the United States 
and this honorable Court.’”139 However, the court distinguishes all of 
these cases because these contextual references to God serve “the le-
gitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing 
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is 
worthy of appreciation in society.”140 Whereas Chief Justice Moore 
unequivocally testified that this display is not just historical, sym-
bolic, or ceremonial, but a monument meant to “acknowledge the law 
and sovereignty of the God of the Holy Scriptures” and to mark “the 
return to the knowledge of God in our land.”141  
 Under the umbrella of the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause, the court assumes the jurisdiction to prohibit Chief Justice 
Moore from believing that there is a moral basis of law that resides 
with the Divine. The court implies that if Chief Justice Moore would 
state that the monument signifies the historical role of the Ten 
Commandments in the development of American jurisprudence, the 
display would pass scrutiny.142 But the court determines that since 
Chief Justice Moore is non-neutral and non-secular in his beliefs, his 
Ten Commandments display and decision to decorate the rotunda 
with the “theme of the moral foundation of law” violates the First 
Amendment.143 Thus the court is not ruling on his placement of the 
monument, but rather on what he thinks and believes. 
 This is the same First Amendment that permitted the Supreme 
Court of 1827 to rely upon the higher law to interpret the constitu-
tional duty of upholding contracts:  
The constitution meant to preserve the inviolability of contracts, as 
secured by those eternal principles of equity and justice which run 
throughout every civilized code, which form a part of the law of na-
ture and of nations, and by which human society, in all countries 
and all ages, has been regulated and upheld. It is said that the ob-
ligation of contracts is derived from the municipal law alone . . . . 
This is what we deny. It springs from a higher source: from those 
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great principles of universal law, which are binding on societies of 
men as well as on individuals.144  
The 1827 Court supported its interpretation by referencing the fa-
mous Dutch lawyer and statesmen Hugo Grotius:  
On this subject we are supplied with noble arguments from the di-
vine oracles, which inform us that God himself, who can be limited 
by no established rules of law, would act contrary to his own na-
ture, if he did not perform his promises. From whence it follows, 
that the obligation to perform promises, springs from the nature of 
that unchangeable justice, which is an attribute of God, and com-
mon to all who bear his image in the use of reason.145  
The 1827 Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation leaves no 
question that the moral foundation of American law lies with God 
himself, yet Chief Justice Moore has been ordered to remove his sup-
posed “unconstitutional” display of God’s law, an order that he views 
as unlawful. Chief Justice Moore took an oath of office to the Consti-
tution of the United States and to the Constitution of the State of 
Alabama, invoking God’s help to uphold this oath. The Preamble to 
Alabama’s Constitution states: 
We, the people of the State of Alabama, in order to establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings 
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, invoking the favor 
and guidance of Almighty God, do ordain and establish the 
following Constitution and form of government for the State 
of Alabama.146 
Acting in accordance with his oath, Chief Justice Moore did not re-
move the Ten Commandments display, but left it for the federal court 
to remove the monument itself. Based on this refusal, a Judicial In-
quiry Commission charged Chief Justice Moore with six violations of 
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, including: 
(1) failing to uphold the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary; 
(2) failing to observe the high standards of conduct so 
that the integrity and independence of the judiciary 
might be preserved; 
(3) failing to avoid impropriety and appearance of impro-
priety; 
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(4) failing to conduct himself in a manner promoting pub-
lic confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary; 
(5) failing to conduct himself in a manner promoting pub-
lic confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary; and  
(6) failing to avoid conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice so as to bring the judicial office into dis-
repute. 147 
The ethics commission made these allegations without first address-
ing whether the federal court order was in fact lawful.148 
 On November 13, 2003, a nine-member panel of the Alabama 
Court of the Judiciary concluded that Chief Justice Moore should be 
removed from office. Chief Justice Moore did not perjure himself, did 
not accept a bribe, did not issue a court opinion contradicting the 
Constitution, but rather in his discretion as the Chief Justice of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, he attempted to acknowledge God, main-
tain high standards of conduct, and educate citizens by memorializ-
ing the moral foundation of American law. And for this he is guilty 
and faces not only removal from the bench, but possibly disbarment.  
 Chief Justice Moore is not the only legal professional under attack 
for believing in a higher authority. As demonstrated in the judicial 
nomination process today, this assault on belief threatens that any 
legal professional who speaks of his faith in God will be found unfit 
for the bench. The current filibustering of judicial nominations 
clearly reflect the bias against legal professionals that acknowledge 
God in their practice. Regardless of the individual’s integrity or im-
peccable qualifications, the mere fact that a judicial nominee is vocal 
about his faith and belief in the moral authority of God brings into 
question his fitness for the bench.149 In his restatement of the Su-
preme Court’s law on religious freedoms, Professor Carl Esbeck 
states that the First Amendment “does not command a separation of 
individual believers from their government—an impossibility, unless 
                                                                                                                      
 147. Court of the Judiciary Case No. 33, In the Matter of: Roy S. Moore, Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of Alabama at 4, Nov. 13, 2003, available at http://www.lc. 
org/attachments/mooreorder.pdf. 
 148. The determination of lawfulness would highlight the collision of two distinct views 
of law: one that believes that a court order is law because the court declares it as such and 
one that believes that no law has any validity if it contradicts divine law no matter what 
court (or man) declares it. 
 149. See, e.g., Pryor Blocked from U.S. Appeals Court by Democrats, nbc13.com, July 
31, 2003 (reporting on the blocking of President Bush’s judicial nomination of Alabama At-
torney General William Pryor, Texas Judge Priscilla Owen, and District of Columbia law-
yer Miguel Estrada), at http://www.nbc13.com/news/2372338/detail.html. 
2004]                          AUTHORITY OF THE LAW? 735 
 
one is prepared either to cleave in half the human heart or to disen-
franchise all religious citizens.”150  
 Institutionalized legal education’s rejection of the Lawgiver, which 
is reflected in the courts today, is in essence an attempt to cleave the 
heart of the law student and the legal professional by mandating 
neutrality. In reality, neutrality is an illusion that presumes that 
secularism, naturalism, scientism, or atheism is not a religious be-
lief. One who places his faith in God as sovereign is neither more nor 
less religious than one who places his faith in himself as sovereign. 
Both are religious. One worships God and the Creator while the 
other places faith in himself and the created. The manifestation of 
legal positivism exemplified by the demand for neutrality in Estab-
lishment Clause case law is in practice awarding more protections 
and preference to the religion of humanism or secularism and forcing 
the legal professional who believes in God to deny His authority. 
B.   Law Contrary to Moral Beliefs 
 Postmodernist author Sanford Levison acknowledges that “[t]he 
transition of the basis of law from principle to will has the effect of 
analytically separating law from morality; there is the dissolution of 
any guarantee that fidelity to law necessarily will mean equal fidel-
ity to principles of moral conduct.”151 The alarming truth is that this 
separation is not only accepted, but taught within the majority of 
America’s legal institutions. It is a common occurrence for a law stu-
dent to be told that morals have nothing to do with the study of law. 
This belief combined with the instruction that legal principles con-
tinually evolve through appellate opinions raises the question: If 
there is no moral dimension to law and no authority to say what is 
right and wrong, what non-moral compass guides the judiciary’s ap-
plication and development of the legal principles and who is to say 
they are not wrong? The answer: It is relative and discretionary to 
the sitting bench.  
 Within this philosophy lays the positivist’s principles of precedent 
and stare decisis.152 These principles in proper context do promote 
consistency and predictability. However, when the bench selectively 
adheres to these principles and dismisses any external authority for 
the law, the court assumes the role as the lawmaker. It operates as if 
the judicial opinion is subordinate to nothing beyond the judiciary, 
which in practice gives cases preemptive power over legislated codes 
such as constitutions and statutes and produces an unwarranted fa-
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vor for judges over the authoritative lawgivers.153 Legal positivism 
combined with an obvious judicial supremacy fundamentally permits 
legal principles to become manipulative tools for the judge or advo-
cate to advance his individual or personal sense of right and wrong. 
Despite the asserted role of precedent and stare decisis,154 this juris-
prudence results in an unpredictable “rule of law” riddled with in-
consistencies and contradictions. The manipulation of positivist prin-
ciples leads to the degeneration of the law’s fidelity, which is evi-
denced in recent court decisions involving the moral issues of homo-
sexuality and abortion.155  
 In Lawrence v. Texas,156 the U.S. Supreme Court held the Texas 
sodomy statute unconstitutional, but in order to do so it needed to 
address its former opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick157 and the principle 
of stare decisis. Justice Kennedy cites a few cases and concludes that, 
“there has been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the 
sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once there are 
compelling reasons to do so.”158 He goes on to declare that Justice 
Steven’s dissenting opinion “should have been controlling in Bowers 
and should control here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent 
. . . . and now is overruled.”159 Justice Kennedy selectively determined 
that the dissenting opinion in Bowers would govern and adopted the 
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reasons or rationale cited that is essential to the decision that constitutes the binding legal 
principle. The holdings and supportive legal arguments form the precedent that is binding 
in similar subsequent cases. Traditionally, precedent is differentiated from the narrow doc-
trine of stare decisis that developed in the nineteenth century. The strict doctrine of stare 
decisis treats a particular case or decision as binding authority within its jurisdiction in 
any following analogous cases. Neither precedent nor stare decisis finds its roots in the 
natural law theory with the understanding that law conforms to a set of transcendent 
standards imposed by a Divine. Rather both principles root in a legal positivist philosophy 
based on the idea that the connection or relation of one legal rule with another will provide 
judicial integrity and seemingly raise the judicial decision above the level of sheer expedi-
ency. Berman & Reid, Jr., supra note 65, at 447-50. 
 155. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (holding the Texas sodomy statute 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (distinguishing virtual child pornography from 
child pornography and declaring virtual child pornography lawful, protected speech under 
the First Amendment); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (holding unconstitutional 
a Nebraska statute prohibiting partial birth abortion as creating a “substantial obstacle” 
for a women to get an abortion). 
 156. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 157. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the Georgia sodomy statute and stating that the 
Constitution does not confer a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy). 
 158. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.  
 159. Id. at 2484.  
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reasoning that “the fact that a governing majority in a State has tra-
ditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”160  
 Justice Kennedy chose to disregard the majority opinion of Justice 
White in Bowers which reasoned that the law, “is constantly based on 
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral 
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the 
courts will be very busy indeed.”161 Kennedy further ignores Justice 
Burger’s concurring opinion in Bowers that stated: 
[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very “ancient roots.” De-
cisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been 
subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western 
civilization. . . .  
 This is essentially not a question of personal “preferences” but 
rather of the legislative authority of the State.162  
He also rejects Justice Powell’s statement in Bowers that “I cannot 
say that conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a 
fundamental right.”163 Justice Kennedy’s intentional departure from 
stare decisis is permissible under the philosophy of legal positivism—
a philosophy that permits inconsistent application and manipulation.  
 Justice Kennedy’s treatment of stare decisis in Lawrence differed 
greatly from that in the 1992 case, Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey.164 In Casey, Justice Kennedy concurred in 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion that the “principles of institutional integ-
rity, and the rule of stare decisis”165 required that the essential hold-
ing in Roe v. Wade166 be retained and reaffirmed. The adherence to 
the principle of stare decisis in Casey permitted the Court to dissect a 
Pennsylvania statue regulating abortion and hold that particular 
parts of the statute created an “undue burden” on the woman’s right 
to an abortion.167 Justice Scalia counters the majority opinion in his 
pointed dissent: 
                                                                                                                      
 160. Id. at 2483. 
 161. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.  
 162. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 164. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 165. Id. at 845-46. 
 166. 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (holding the Texas criminal abortion statute unconstitu-
tional because the woman’s fundamental right to an abortion, at certain stages of preg-
nancy, exceeded the state’s compelling interests to protect “the health and safety” of the 
mother and protect “the potential future human life”). 
 167. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. In the same fashion, the Florida Supreme Court demon-
strated the inconsistent application of stare decisis and selective following of precedent 
when it recently held a one-parent notification statute, with judicial bypass for a minor 
seeking an abortion, unconstitutional. Justice Shaw wrote, “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis, 
or the obligation of a court to abide by its own precedent, is grounded on the need for sta-
bility in the law and has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for 
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The Court’s reliance upon stare decisis can best be described as 
contrived. It insists upon the necessity of adhering not to all of 
Roe, but only to what it calls the “central holding.” It seems to me 
that stare decisis ought to be applied even to the doctrine of stare 
decisis, and I confess never to have heard of this new, keep-what-
you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version.168  
 The Florida Supreme Court has also demonstrated this version of 
stare decisis noted by Justice Scalia. In North Florida Women’s 
Health and Counseling Service v. Florida,169 the court held a one-
parent notification statute, with judicial bypass for a minor seeking 
an abortion, unconstitutional. Justice Shaw wrote, “[t]he doctrine of 
stare decisis, or the obligation of a court to abide by its own prece-
dent, is grounded on the need for stability in the law and has been a 
fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries.”170 
He concludes, “[t]he presumption in favor of stare decisis is strong, 
and where the decision in issue was a watershed judgment resolving 
a deeply divisive societal controversy, the presumption in favor of 
stare decisis is at its zenith.”171 
 Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s dismissal of stare decisis in Law-
rence, Justice Shaw declares stare decisis as the “zenith” in the con-
                                                                                                                      
centuries.” He concludes, “[t]he presumption in favor of stare decisis is strong, and where 
the decision in issue was a watershed judgment resolving a deeply divisive societal contro-
versy, the presumption in favor of stare decisis is at its zenith.” N. Fla. Women’s Health & 
Counseling Serv. v. Florida, 2003 WL 21546546, at *17-*18 (Fla. July 10, 2003). 
 Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s dismissal of stare decisis in the context of the “divisive so-
cietal controversy” of homosexual sodomy, Justice Shaw declares stare decisis as the “ze-
nith” in the context of abortion, permitting reliance upon the precedent set by In re T.W., 
551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). In T.W., the Florida Supreme Court held a parental consent 
statute unconstitutional and stated that it imposed “a significant restriction on a minor’s 
right of privacy.” 
 Justice Shaw states that the court must rely upon the trial court’s faithful application of 
the controlling law from T.W. and consequently affirms the trial court’s decision holding 
the statute unconstitutional. N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Serv., 2003 WL 
21546546, at *19. Justice Shaw provides this holding despite the fact that in 1990, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that either a one-parent or two-parent notification requirement is 
constitutional as long as the statute provides a judicial bypass option for the minor. Hodg-
son v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). The Court reaffirmed this finding in 1992, when it 
held that a Pennsylvania abortion statute requiring one-parent consent with a judicial by-
pass option did not create an undue burden on an unemancipated minor’s right to privacy. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
 The Florida Supreme Court dismisses U.S. Supreme Court jurisdictional precedent by 
declaring that the Florida Constitution provides for a “broader, more protective right” than 
the federal Constitution. N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Serv., 2003 WL 21546546, 
at *5. This presumption gives the Florida Supreme Court the liberty to claim a broader 
privacy right for Floridian minors to justify its distinct evaluation of compelling state in-
terests and to disguise its unwillingness to submit to the authoritative federal case law. In 
re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192. 
 168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 993 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 169. 2003 WL 21546546, at *17-*18 (Fla. July 10, 2003). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  
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text of abortion and relies upon the precedent set by In re T.W.172 In 
In re T.W., the Florida Supreme Court held a parental consent stat-
ute unconstitutional and stated that it imposed “a significant restric-
tion on a minor’s right of privacy.” Justice Shaw insists he must rely 
upon the trial court’s faithful application of the controlling law from 
T.W. and consequently affirms the trial court’s decision holding the 
statute unconstitutional.173 
 Justice Shaw decided to keep-what-he-wanted from the Florida 
Supreme Court In re T.W. opinion, and threw-away the U.S. Supreme 
Court case law. In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held that either a 
one-parent or two-parent notification requirement is constitutional 
as long as the statute provides a judicial bypass option for the mi-
nor.174 The Court reaffirmed this finding in 1992, when it held that a 
Pennsylvania abortion statute requiring one-parent consent with a 
judicial bypass option did not create an undue burden on an une-
mancipated minor’s right to privacy.175 The Florida Supreme Court 
dismisses this precedent by declaring that the Florida Constitution 
provides for a “broader, more protective right” than the federal Con-
stitution.176 This presumption gives the Florida Supreme Court the 
liberty to claim a broader privacy right for Floridian minors and jus-
tifies its own evaluation of compelling state interests.177 These cases 
exemplify the courts’ response to efforts that have been made by 
Congress and state legislatures to pass laws confining the courts’ in-
terpretation of constitutional protections—particularly First Amend-
ment protections. In reviewing these legislated acts, the courts tend 
to exploit stare decisis and assume the role of assessing public policy. 
By framing an issue as a constitutional question, they assert their 
authority to weigh the compelling interests of the state and to de-
termine what interests are to be protected and when. 
 In another effort to regulate abortion, Congress recently passed 
the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003. The intent of the Act is to 
limit the procedures performed when carrying out the judicially de-
clared woman’s right to an abortion. After signing the Act, President 
Bush stated, “[T]he most basic duty of government is to defend the 
life of the innocent . . . . The right to life cannot be granted or denied 
by government, because it does not come from government [including 
the courts], it comes from the Creator of Life.”178 Yet the courts have 
                                                                                                                      
 172. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). 
 173. N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Serv., 2003 WL 21546546, at *19. 
 174. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
 175. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 176. N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Serv., 2003 WL 21546546, at *5. 
 177. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192. 
 178. The White House, President George W. Bush, President Bush Signs Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Nov. 5, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ 
11/20031105-1.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). 
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assumed the authority to declare when life begins and when it should 
end.179 The President and Congress seem to disagree with this pre-
sumption.180 
 Current American jurisprudence invoking legal positivism disen-
gages morality and corrupts the fidelity of the law by permitting a 
judicial elite to exercise moral superiority and to disparately apply 
evolving principles. This approach to law is exactly what Justice Cur-
tis warned about 146 years ago in his dissenting opinion from Dred 
Scott v. Sanford:  
[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the 
fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, 
and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control 
its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the 
government of individual men, who for the time being have power 
to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of 
what it ought to mean.181 
In the same fashion, when the institution of legal education aban-
dons the Lawgiver and a fixed set of moral truths, it results in a pro-
fession with no moral compass that advocates a rule of law that is 
individualistic, inconsistent, uncertain, and at times unconscionable. 
 VII.   EFFORTS TO REDEEM A FALLEN PROFESSION 
 As legal positivism seeped into the realm of legal ethics and mani-
fested the new paradigm that disavowed any connection between law 
and morality, the legal profession continued in ethical decline. By the 
1980s, the legal profession was in a recognized crisis state. The ABA 
and law schools sensed the urgency to respond to the profession’s 
ethical crisis. But their response was seemingly constrained by two 
fundamental premises. The first is that legal ethics is different from 
ordinary ethics, in that it eliminates the moral conscience. The sec-
ond is the premise that the legal system is adversarial and demands 
a lawyer to fulfill his role as an advocate first and foremost, without 
invoking personal beliefs or sincere pursuits of justice. Under these 
self-imposed constraints, the ABA responded to the crisis by promul-
                                                                                                                      
 179. The Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pinellas County, Florida ordered the removal of the 
gastronomy tube that provided fluids and nourishment to Terri Schiavo, a thirty-three 
year old woman that is in a persistent vegetative state following a cardiac arrest. The ex-
pectancy of the order was that she would die within seven to ten days from starvation and 
dehydration. Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Governor Jeb Bush at 2, Schiavo v. Schiavo (No. 
8:-3-CV-1860-T-26-TGW), available at http://www.myflorida.com/myflorida/government 
/laws/documents/ terri_schiavo.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004). 
 180. The Governor and Legislature of Florida took immediate action “to stay the court-
ordered starvation and dehydration” of Terri Schiavo. House Passes Legislation to Save 
Terri Schiavo, Oct. 20, 2003, at http://www.myfloridahouse.com/NewsDetails.aspx?pkItem 
=2d66b6d1-bbb0-4c9a-876b-56903b303a60 (on file with author). 
 181. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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gating the Model Rules and including the accreditation requirement 
to instruct on the Model Rules.182 As a cohort in the effort to redeem 
the profession and to meet the new accreditation standard, law 
schools began to construct the field of professional responsibility.183  
A.   Emergence of Professional Responsibility 
 The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct “provide a frame-
work for the ethical practice of law”184 and create the substance of the 
field of Professional Responsibility. The ABA’s dictates on duties, 
values, and responsibilities are its attempt to fill the void left by the 
dismissal of a higher authority. In the absence of divine authority 
and ordinary morality, the ABA assumes the position of authority to 
which the legal professional’s moral conduct is guided and account-
able. The preamble to the Model Rules explains that:  
 A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an offi-
cer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmoni-
ous. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer 
can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same 
time assume that justice is being done.185 
 According to the ABA, the legal professional is to focus on being a 
“zealous advocate” and just “assume that justice is being done.” They 
are not to pursue or seek justice, but rather “assume” that justice 
will always occur when one upholds the “harmonious” responsibili-
ties to the client, court, and public. However, the ABA goes on to 
state that although these responsibilities are “usually harmonious”:  
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between 
a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the 
lawyer’s own interest in remaining an upright person while earn-
ing a satisfactory living . . . . Such issues must be resolved through 
the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided 
by the basic principles underlying the Rules.186 
                                                                                                                      
 182. The current ABA accreditation Standard 302(b) requires that:  
A law school shall require all students in the J.D. degree program to receive in-
struction in the history, goals, structure, duties, values, and responsibilities of 
the legal profession and its members, including instruction in the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association.  
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., STANDARDS 
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS, CHAPTER 3: PROGRAM OF STUDY, 
at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter3.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 183. See Baron & Greenstein, supra note 67, at 76-77 (discussing the law school’s con-
struction of professional responsibility as a field of law). 
 184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope para. 14 (2001), reprinted in 2002 
SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (Foundation Press 2002) [here-
inafter ABA MODEL RULES]. 
 185. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Pmbl. para. 7, supra  note 184, at 4. 
 186. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Pmbl. para. 8, supra  note 184, at 4. 
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 As a lawyer, I should ask what are the basic principles that un-
derlie the Rules, the ones that I should use to guide my moral judg-
ment. The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission specifies these principles in 
the proposed revision of the Model Rules. “These principles include 
the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s le-
gitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a 
professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved 
in the legal system.”187 The Model Rules outline the rules governing 
the client-lawyer relationship and emphasize the roles and responsi-
bilities of the advocate.188 The ABA’s guiding principles rest on loy-
alty to the client and lead to an indictment of the legal profession: All 
cases of injustice derive from a lack of being “well represented.”189 Al-
though the intent is to bolster demand for legal representation, the 
ABA actually makes the lawyer guilty of every injustice perpetuated 
upon a person with counsel and causes the profession to bear an in-
appropriate burden.190  
 In turn, the field of Professional Responsibility holds true to the 
ABA’s underlying principles as it instructs on the Model Rules. Two 
law professors discuss the effects of the ABA’s directed professional 
responsibility movement.191 They equate the law student’s approach 
to the “law of professional responsibility” to any other body of legal 
doctrine—an approach that entails strategic pursuits in furtherance 
of the interests of both the client and the lawyer.192 They observe that 
the specific rules governing ethical problems promulgated by an ex-
ternal rule-maker, disengaged from ordinary morality, diverges the 
study of ethics from what is right and good to mere compliance193—
mere compliance to a set of rules that relies upon extrinsic versus in-
trinsic motivations for ethical conduct. They conclude that this ap-
proach to ethics frees the law student and legal professional from a 
moral authority and issues the liberty to strategically maneuver the 
rules as a zealous advocate.194  
                                                                                                                      
 187. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Pmbl. para. 9 (proposed rules, Aug., 2001), re-
printed in 2002 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 300 (Foundation 
Press 2002). 
 188. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 184. 
 189. Rubottom Interview, supra note 119. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Baron & Greenstein, supra note 67. 
 192. Id. at 76-77.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 77-79. Baron and Greenstein discuss four characteristics of the field of pro-
fessional responsibility that cause the law student to approach the code of ethical rules 
strategically. First, the source of rules is external to the individual, and the rule-maker is 
not presumed good. Second, the meaning of the ethical rules is variable. Third, the ethical 
rules are both under- and over-inclusive. Fourth, ethical rules are not unique in that they 
have qualities of vagueness and open-texture. They conclude that these characteristics 
make the rules of professional conduct subject to interpretation and exploitable by the le-
gal advocate.  
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 This liberty and duty of advocacy accounts for the prevailing ques-
tion posed in my Professional Responsibility class: “Can a good per-
son be a good lawyer?”195 To address this question, the professor be-
gan with an overview of the influential, humanistic theories on eth-
ics.196 But since none of them provided any absolute moral authority, 
the discussion quickly proceeded to the regulation of the legal profes-
sion and instruction on the ABA’s Model Rules. By means of a case-
book, the curriculum introduced fact scenarios and prompted appli-
cation of the governing Model Rules. Interpretive comments, case 
law, and ABA opinions guided the proper application of the Model 
Rules, and for discussion purposes, the professor used a model of the 
three lawyer types to assess the lawyer’s conflicting responsibili-
ties.197 But the purpose of the discussion was not to instruct on a 
preferential way to prioritize the conflicting responsibilities. Rather 
the model was to reveal the characteristics associated with each law-
yer type. Upon the conclusion of the semester the question of “Can a 
good person be a good lawyer?” was answered in light of Harper Lee’s 
character Atticus Finch;198 an example intended to permit the law 
student to reconcile ethical conduct with zealous advocacy.  
 Thus, the field of Professional Responsibility is evidently designed 
to simply advise the student on the conflicts that may arise in the 
practice of law and offers the Model Rules as the moral authority and 
incentive for professional conduct. Yet the Model Rules do little more 
than inform the lawyer on how to avoid civil liability and bar disci-
pline. As a result, the professional responsibility movement fails to 
re-introduce the conscience or an authority beyond the profession, 
and seems to serve only to necessitate the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Exam.199  
                                                                                                                      
 195. Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853 
(1992). 
 196. The theoretical discussion included sets of three. First, the three models of human 
interaction of altruism, exploitation, and mutualism. Second, the three moralities of “left,” 
“right,” and “old.” Third, the three schools of thought entailing meta-ethical realism, inter-
pretivist, and skepticism. There was also mention of Lon Fuller’s discussion of his two mo-
ralities relating to law, the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty. Two Bible sto-
ries were introduced, but they were flippantly discussed with the professor drawing mis-
construed lessons from them. 
 197. Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 259, 304-17 (1995). The three types of Lawyers are: Type I is the Neutral Partisan; 
Type II is the Public Partisan; and Type III is the Partisan-Partisan. The Neutral Partisan 
is the most zealous advocate that will do all that the law allows for the client and nothing 
else matters. The Public Partisan is the advocate for public policy and will only utilize the 
law as intended and in conformance with social norms. The Partisan-Partisan is the pri-
vate/sectarian advocate that will employ the “Rambo” tactics of the Neutral Partisan, but 
only for issues in accordance with his own beliefs or norms.  
 198. Harper Lee’s character Atticus Finch from To Kill a Mockingbird was noted as a 
Type II Public Partisan Lawyer and one that exemplified how a good person can be a good 
lawyer.  
 199. Hayden, supra note 74, at 1335. 
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B.   Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam 
 Following the ABA’s adoption of the 1969 Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, the ABA began to discuss the imposition of a nationally 
standardized measure for legal ethics based on its promulgated 
rules.200 In furtherance of this idea, the NCBE created the MPRE “to 
measure the examinee’s knowledge and understanding of established 
standards related to a lawyer’s professional conduct.”201 The NCBE 
acknowledges that “the MPRE is not a test to determine an individ-
ual’s personal ethical values”202 and is a limited measure of ethics. 
“Passing the test does not signal that the successful examinee will be 
an ethical practitioner; ‘The most unethical individual in the world 
can study the Code and tell you what it is they are not supposed to 
do.’”203 Because the MPRE is not a reliable measure of an ethical 
practitioner and does nothing more than motivate law schools to 
meet ABA accreditation standards, it does little to alleviate the ethi-
cal crisis within the profession.  
 The ABA and law schools have gone to great measures through 
the Professional Responsibility movement and MPRE requirement to 
regenerate the concept of professional conduct within the study and 
practice of law. However, without reference or accountability to an 
external moral authority, these efforts to redeem the fallen profes-
sion are and will continue to be futile and self-serving. The Model 
Rules and the systematic construction of Professional Responsibility 
and the MPRE in place of applying ordinary moral principles do 
nothing more than acknowledge and evidence the tripartite crisis. 
VIII.   IDENTIFYING THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 
 St. Paul reminds the Colossian Christians to “[S]ee to it that no 
one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, 
which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this 
world rather than on Christ.”204 This passage highlights the battle 
between humanistic philosophies, depicting man as generally good 
and capable of achieving perfection, and the truth of divine revela-
tion, depicting man’s depravity and incapacity to achieve the per-
fect.205 Today’s institutionalized legal academia relies strictly on 
                                                                                                                      
 200. Id. at 1301. 
 201. National Conference of Bar Examiners, Description of the Examination, at 
http://www.ncbex.org/tests/mpre/mpre.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Hayden, supra note 74, at 1336. 
 204. Colossians 2:8. 
 205. Psalm 14:1-3. 
The fool says in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt, their deeds are 
vile; there is no one who does good. The Lord looks down from heaven on the 
sons of men to see if there are any who understand, any who seek God. All have 
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theories and philosophies of law that abrogate God and presume that 
man, or at least the embodied legal elite, is generally good and 
enlightened. These presumptions are contrary to the foundational be-
lief of the Common Law and the Constitution.206 James Madison, the 
Father of the Constitution, explained the need for proper checks and 
balances between the branches of government in The Federalist No. 
51: 
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should 
be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is gov-
ernment itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on gov-
ernment would be necessary. In framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and 
in the next place oblige it to control itself.207  
The Founding Fathers recognized the necessity of external controls 
within government and the same checks are necessary within the le-
gal profession.208 
 It was the Founding Fathers’ acknowledgement of God’s sover-
eignty and the necessity for humble submission to God’s authority, 
law, and wisdom that underlaid and inspired the law of this land. 
This inspiration is evident in the Declaration of Independence. Stat-
ing basic American principles, the Declaration served as the founda-
tion for the Constitution’s construction of a government purposed to 
secure the liberty of the unalienable rights endowed by the Crea-
tor.209 The practical application of the Constitution without the prin-
ciples of the Declaration causes instability and threatens the liberty 
envisioned by the Founding Fathers.210 
                                                                                                                      
turned aside, they have together become corrupt; there is no one who does good, 
not even one. 
Id.; Romans 3:22-23 (“There is no difference, for all have sinned and fall short of the glory 
of God.”); see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 30 (stating “[a]nd if our reason were always 
. . . clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, . . . we should need no 
other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his 
reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error.”); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51 (James Madison); EIDSMOE, supra note 20, at 369-72.  
 206. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 41; HOFFMAN, supra note 1; DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 20.  
 207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 208. See generally Jennifer M. Kraus, Attorney Discipline Systems: Improving Public 
Perception and Increasing Efficacy, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 273, 284-300 (2000) (discussing the 
criticisms of attorney discipline systems and the shortcomings of self-regulation, conclud-
ing that, “[s]elf-regulation by the legal profession is criticized and distrusted, both by the 
public and by members of the profession”). 
 209. EIDSMOE, supra note 20, at 62. 
 210. Id. at 361-62. 
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 From where did the Founding Fathers learn these principles 
about law and jurisprudence? Whom did they read, study, and refer-
ence? The Founding Fathers made thirty-four percent of all their ref-
erences to the Bible. And they turned to Montesquieu, Blackstone, 
and Locke as their most significantly cited “thinkers.”211 Men not 
known as deists and philosophers, but men known as conservative 
legal and political thinkers, also known to be Christians.212 John Ad-
ams stated, “[o]ur Constitution was made only for a moral and reli-
gious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any 
other.”213 John Adams recognized that without moral accountability 
America’s vision of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”214 
would be lost.  
 In Federalist No. 51, James Madison acknowledged that “a power 
independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of 
the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may pos-
sibly be turned against both parties.”215 The legal profession in Amer-
ica and more specifically the judiciary is endangering the master-
work of the Founding Fathers by assuming a “power independent of 
society” and rejecting any external authority, specifically the Divine. 
Just as Moses, King David,216 Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke217 
understood that God was the source of wisdom and law, the Found-
ing Fathers established a nation founded on biblical principles and 
adopted much of the English Common Law rooted in those same 
principles.218 President George Washington declared, in his Procla-
mation of the First National Thanksgiving Holiday, “[I]t is the duty 
of all nations to acknowledge the Providence of Almighty God, to 
obey his will, to be grateful for his benefits, humbly to implore his 
protection and favor.”219 
                                                                                                                      
 211. Two Professors, Donald Lutz and Charles Hyman, conducted a study to determine 
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S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American 
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 212. EIDSMOE, supra note 20, at 2. 
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IX.   CHARGE TO LAW STUDENTS 
 In an imagined law school graduation address to the class of 2035, 
one commencement speaker shares his hope for the revival of the le-
gal profession. “It is not surprising, then, that the revival of the 
American legal profession this century has coincided with the grad-
ual return of religion and sound theological thinking.”220 He shares 
that the revival must first begin with the individuals before it can 
penetrate the culture and the American institutions. In the end 
though, “even in our law schools, the language of religion and theol-
ogy, so strongly rooted in the law and justice, was again part of, first, 
the ethical curriculum, and then gradually the substantive 
courses.”221  
 I too share this hope and challenge law students to use the power 
of the consumer to spark revival within the institutions of the ABA-
accredited law schools; a revival that instructs the law student about 
the moral dimension of law; a revival that permits the legal profes-
sional to candidly acknowledge the Sovereign. As law students and 
future legal professionals, we must begin to call the bluffs of our legal 
educators.222 We must ask from where does the law gain its author-
ity. We must acknowledge and propagate what we know to be true—
that transcendent moral principles govern law. We must not accept a 
philosophy that instructs law to be ever evolving and reliant on the 
enlightenment of man. We must rely on what we know to be right. 
And we must exercise discretion in the institution and professors we 
select to provide our legal education.223  
 The obstacles to overcome are high, but I make these challenges 
fully aware of how entrenched modern jurisprudence is. It is intimi-
dating to raise your hand in class and make yourself vulnerable to 
the attacks of the legal academy. The encouragement I offer to stu-
dents is that you can speak with authority. Your reasoning and ap-
proach to law is rational and creditable. And there is a place for it in 
legal education.224 It does rely on faith in God, but what is faith? 
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Faith is the “confident belief in the truth, value or trustworthiness of 
a person, idea or thing”225—belief that does not rest in what is seen. 
Your faith is in the omnipotence and omnipresence of God. But re-
member the positivist’s position too relies on faith—faith in man and 
the created. Man’s knowledge is limited and imperfect, while God’s is 
infinite and infallible. When engaged, the reasoning of a legal posi-
tivist can be overcome because it is circular and inconsistent. Yet the 
goal is not spiritual conversion. Rather it is the acknowledgement 
that the laws of this nation rely upon an external authority greater 
than man and greater than the bench. 
X.   CONCLUSION 
 By implementing the scientific method, premised on the notion 
that man can discover the rules of law independently of God, Lang-
dell, Holmes, and their devout disciples undermined the revealed law 
and redefined the role of the legal profession—contrary to early 
American jurisprudence and legal instruction.226 Their secularization 
of legal education furthered by the ABA has had a lasting impact on 
America’s legal institutions through the spread of legal positivism. 
Legal positivism manifests manipulation and arrogance, while the 
legal philosophy that acknowledges a divine lawgiver demands sub-
mission and humility—a humility that was once known within the 
noble profession of law.227 This humility is desperately needed within 
America’s legal community today.  
 After nearly a century of institutionalized legal positivism, much 
of the legal profession is captivated by a philosophy that dictates 
there is no external authority or accountability in the law beyond 
that which is judicially acknowledged. As a result, the courts have 
abused their jurisdiction and created law that denies the sovereignty 
of God and contradicts traditional moral belief. The ABA’s Model 
Rules and law schools’ construction of Professional Responsibility fail 
to properly identify the cause of the tripartite crisis and attempt to 
moralize without introducing an external, absolute source of moral-
ity. Without acknowledgment of an external lawgiver to whom the 
lawyer is accountable, the ABA and law schools will continue to pro-
duce legal professionals that further exacerbates the tripartite crisis. 
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 So why did you go to law school? As one who went to law school 
with a high regard for the rule of law and the authority from which it 
originated, I do have hope that the future of legal education and 
practice is not beyond the reintegration of the moral conscience and 
the reconnection of the authoritative lawgiver to the law.228 
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